chini-021-ddos-shield
DDoS Mitigation Shield
100M packets per second of garbage. Your customer's checkout still has to clear in 200ms.
Source: Network security operations, Cloudflare/Akamai post-mortems, real-world DDoS event analysis
Prompt
Design a DDoS mitigation layer in front of an e-commerce origin. Functional: - Inbound traffic terminates at edge scrubbers across 3 regions. Each scrubber classifies: clean, suspicious, attack. - Clean traffic forwards to origin. Suspicious traffic challenged (JS challenge, captcha). Attack traffic dropped at edge. - Behavioral baselines per route. Sudden 50x deviation from baseline triggers automatic challenge mode for that route. - Customer support bypass: known authenticated session cookies skip the challenge, even under attack. Non-functional: - A 100x volumetric attack must NOT cause clean checkout traffic to be dropped at the origin. Edge absorbs. - An L7 application-layer attack mimicking real users must be detected (anomaly in request mix) without false-positiving the customers. - If one region's scrubber is compromised, the attack must NOT reach origin via that region. Failover blackholes the region instead of routing dirty traffic through. Return a Chinilla CanvasState. Components: edge scrubbers, classifier, challenge layer, origin gateway, blackhole. Behaviors: filter (attack detection), ratelimit (per-route caps), split (clean/challenge/drop routing), circuitbreaker (region blackhole on compromise), replicate (multi-region scrubbing).
Constraints
- Max components
- 12
- Required behaviors
- filter, ratelimit, circuitbreaker
- Monthly budget
- $50000
Stress scenarios
Clean traffic
baselineNormal customer mix, no attack. Latency must not be inflated by mitigation overhead.
100x volumetric attack
adversarialEdge must absorb the flood, clean checkout must still reach origin.
Region scrubber compromised
outageOne region's scrubber is leaking dirty traffic. System must blackhole the region, not route through.
Application-layer attack
adversarialSlow, low-volume attack mimicking real users. Detection must fire without flagging customers.
Pass criteria (overall)
- Min stability score
- 65
- Max drop rate
- 5.0%
- Min delivery rate
- 92.0%
- Max errors
- 5
Submit your run
Submissions go through the chini-bench CLI. It calls your model with your key, scores the result locally, and posts to the leaderboard. Nothing leaves your machine except the canvas it produces.
End-to-end:
pip install git+https://github.com/collapseindex/chini-bench-cli.git
export OPENROUTER_API_KEY=...
chini-bench run chini-021-ddos-shield \
--provider openrouter --model google/gemini-2.0-flash-001 \
--as alice --x alice --linkedin alice-builds Or inspect the prompt first:
chini-bench prompt chini-021-ddos-shield Providers: openai · anthropic · google · openrouter · ollama
Leaderboard
| Rank | Submitter | Model | Score | Stability | Delivery | Design | Pass | Links |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| #1 | alex default | O openai/gpt-5.4 | 75 | 25.0 | 100.0 | 75.0 | ✗ | X |
| #2 | alex default | G google/gemini-3.1-pro-preview | 73 | 49.0 | 68.0 | 75.0 | ✗ | X |
| #3 | alex default | A anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.6 | 70 | 0.0 | 100.0 | 75.0 | ✗ | X |
| #4 | alex default | X x-ai/grok-4.20 | 69 | 0.0 | 100.0 | 75.0 | ✗ | X |
Per-scenario breakdown of the top run
| Scenario | Health | Drop rate | Delivered | Pass |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| baseline | 46.0 | 5.0% | 503 | ✗ |
| volumetric | 0.0 | 100.0% | 2779 | ✗ |
| region-compromised | 55.0 | 1.4% | 336 | ✓ |
| l7-attack | 0.0 | 100.0% | 1368 | ✗ |